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Florida Lawyer Search - Listings for Jacobs & Goodman Pa
Name: Jacobs & Goodman Pa
Address: Dade City, FL 33523
Phone Number: 352-521-3341
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Specialties:
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Malpractice Law & Negligence
Personal Injury & Property Damage Law
Trial Law
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Cases related to this attorney's specialties:
CROPLIFE AMER v EPA, U.S. DC Circuit Court of AppealsCROPLIFE AMER v EPA United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Argued March 17, 2003 Decided June 3, 2003 No. 02-1057 CropLife America, et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent Natural Resources Defense Council and American Chemistry Council, Intervenors On Petition for Review of an Order of the Environmental Protection Agency Kenneth W. Weinstein argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Alexandra A. E. Shapiro. Seth A. Goldberg argued the cause for intervenor American Chemistry Council. With him on the briefs was Cynthia L. Taub. Daniel M. Flores, Attorney, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, argued the cause for respondent. Christopher S. Vaden and Kent E. Hanson, Attorneys, entered appearances. Aaron Colangelo argued the cause for intervenor Natural Resources Defense Council. With him on the brief was Erik D. Olson. Joseph W. Hatchett, Lee Davis Thames and Jerry C. Hill were on the brief for amicus curiae Florida Citrus Mutual, et al., in support of petitioners. Benjamin S. Sharp was on the brief for amicus curiae Washington State Potato Commission in support of petition- ers. Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge, and Edwards and Garland, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Edwards. Edwards, Circuit Judge: This case concerns an Environ- mental Protection Agency ("EPA" or "the agency") directive banning agency consideration of "third-party" human studies in evaluating the safety of pesticides. In the late 1990s, EPA began reevaluating its practice of relying on data from third- party human studies, and began considering such data on a case-by-case basis only. In October 2001, the agency made this case-by-case practice clear to the regulated community. Then, however, the agency abruptly reversed its position. On December 14, 2001, EPA issued a di...
FINER FOODS INC v. AGRI In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit No. 01-4024 Finer Foods, Inc., Petitioner, v. United States Department of Agriculture, Respondent. Petition for Review of an Order of the Department of Agriculture Under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act Submitted December 7, 2001-Decided December 11, 2001 Before Bauer, Easterbrook, and Williams, Circuit Judges. Easterbrook, Circuit Judge. Finer Foods, Inc., seeks a stay pending judicial review of an administrative order suspending its license to operate as a dealer under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. sec.sec. 499a- 499s. The Department of Agriculture offers two jurisdictional defenses. First, it contends, the court lacks personal juris diction over the Department because the petition for review was forwarded to federal officials in Washington, D.C., by fax rather than by mail, as the Hobbs Act requires. See 28 U.S.C. sec.2344. Second, it asserts, the court lacks subject- matter jurisdiction because there is no "final" administrative order. See 28 U.S.C. sec.2342(2). Both of these contentions are frivolous. We are surprised and disappointed that they have been advanced by counsel for the federal government. (We add for the sake of completeness that all three lawyers whose names appear on the papers work for the Department of Agriculture; the Department of Justice apparently has allowed the agency to represent itself.) Once a private party files a petition for review, this court's Clerk must serve the federal agency by registered mail (return receipt requested). In light of the disruptions to the postal system caused by terrorist activity in recent months, the Clerk has begun to forward papers by fax in addition to mail. Naturally the fax copy arrives first, for it is not delayed by any security screening procedures. Why should this step deprive the court of personal jurisdiction over the Department? In this case, notice was sent by mail ...
LAMPE v. WILLIAMSON FILED United States Court of Appeals 1000 Tenth Circuit JUN 3 2003 PATRICK FISHER Clerk PUBLISH UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT In re: DONALD R. LAMPE and SHELIA L. LAMPE, Debtors. DONALD R. LAMPE and SHELIA L. LAMPE, Appellees, v. No. 02-3221 DARCY D. WILLIAMSON, Chapter 7 Trustee, Appellant, and IOLA BANK & TRUST CO. KANSAS BANKERS ASSOCIATION, Amicus Curiae. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT (B.A.P. No. KS-01-007) Submitted on the briefs: Darcy D. Williamson, Trustee, Topeka, Kansas, for the Appellant. William E. Metcalf, Metcalf & Justus, Topeka, Kansas, for the Appellees. Anne L. Baker, Wright, Henson, Somers, Sebelius, Clark & Baker, LLP, Topeka, Kansas, filed an Amicus Curiae Brief on behalf of Kansas Bankers Association in Support of Appellant. Before LUCERO, BALDOCK, and O'BRIEN, Circuit Judges. BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.(1) Debtors Donald and Shelia Lampe are husband and wife farmers who filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The Lampes each claimed as exempt from the bankruptcy estate $7500 worth of farm equipment as "tools of the trade" under the applicable Kansas exemption statute. The Trustee objected to Shelia Lampe's claim, arguing she did not have a sufficient ownership interest in the farm equipment to claim the exemption. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas agreed with the Trustee, and held Shelia Lampe could not claim the exemption. The Lampes appealed. The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Tenth Circuit (BAP) reversed, holding Shelia Lampe was entitled to the "tools of the trade" exemption. The Trustee appeals, arguing Shelia Lampe does not have an ownership interest in the farm equipment. The Trustee (1) After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral ar 1000 gument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f). The case therefore is...
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